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This paper examines the efficiency of quantity restrictions on
capital exports. When the government can effectively tax foreign-source
income, then it is not efficient to impose restrictions on capital exports
and the optimal tax rates on foreign-source income and domestic-source
income are the same. Such a policy equates the marginal productivity of
domestic capital to the world rate of interest, insuring an efficient
allocation of domestic savings between investment at home and investment
abroad.
However, when the government cannot effectively tax foreign-source
income, as is often the case in practice, then with free capital mobility
the rate-of-return arbitrage must equate the after-tax rate of return on
domestic capital to the world rate of interest. Such an equalization
implies that the before-tax rate of return on domestic capital exceeds the
world rate of interest. Thus, free exports of capital result in an
underinvestrnent in capital at home and an overinvestment in capital
abroad. In this distorted world it would be efficient policy to restrict
capital exports to a point where the marginal productivity of domestic
capital falls below the world rate of interest. At this point the stock
of domestic capital, induced by the restrictive policy, exceeds the level
of domestic capital which would have been optimal under the circumstances
where the government can fully tax foreign-source income.- iv-
Evidently,the case where governments can effectively taxforeign-
source income and need impose no restrictions on capital exports is
preferable from the country point of view to the case where thegovernment
cannot effectively tax foreign-source income and thus having toresort to
quantity restrictions on capital exports. This may explain why the
European Community which is moving towards a single capital market in
1992, also searches for ways to enforce taxation of foreign-source
income, so as to eliminate incentives to locate capital abroad.I. Introduction
The fundamental result of the theory of second-best suggests that
adding distortions to already existing ones may very well enhance
efficiency and welfare. To put it differently, reducing the number of
distortions in the economy may well lower well-being. Thus, even though
there are in general gains from international trade, some restrictions on
free trade may be called for in a distortion-ridden economy.
evertheless, in a recent paper (Razin and Sadka (1989)), we showed that
opening-up an economy to international capital movements enhances
efficiency and welfare, even in the presence of distortionary taxes
(taxes which affect margins of substitution between labor and leisure,
between consumption and savings, etc.), provided these taxes are designed
optimally. )j The setup employed in that analysis assumed that the
government can tax residents on their income from abroad.
However, there is now substantial evidence that governments encounter
severe enforcement difficulties in attempting to tax foreign-source
income. Dooley (1987) estimates that in the 1980-82 time period as much
as $250 billion may be classified as capital flight by U.S. residents.
Tanzi (1987) reports that tax experts were concerned that lowering the
U.S. individual and corporate tax rates in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986
would induce capital drain from other countries by providing a tax
)J The reader who is familiar with the optimal-tax literature will no
doubt recognize that this result is consistent with the aggregate
production-efficiency proposition in a closed economy (see, for instance,
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Sadka (1977)).-2-
advantage to investments in the U.S.. These concerns are based on an
implicit assumption that the governments of these countries cannot
effectively tax their residents on their U.S. income so as to wipe out the
U.S. tax advantage. The issue of capital flight is even more relevant for
developing countries. Cumby and Levich (1987) estimate that a significant
portion of the external debt in developing countries is channelled into
investments abroad through overinvoicing of imports and uriderinvoicing of
exports. Dooley (1988) estimates that capital flight from a large number
of developing countries amounts to about one-third of their external debt
in the time period 1977-1984.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the efficiency (from a
social viewpoint) of free international capital movements in the presence
of severe difficulties of taxing foreign-source income due to capital
flight. Specifically, we investigate the appropriateness of controls on
capital exports or imports. The paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents a stylized model of an open economy which is
integrated in the world capital market and uses an optimal set of taxes to
finance public consumption. Section III analyzes a benchmark case where
income from abroad can be fully taxed. The central section of the paper,
Section IV, examines the case where governments cannot effectively tax
foreign-source income. A special attention is paid to the design of
optimal incentives for investment at home and to the design of efficient
restrictions on capital exports. Section V concludes the paper. In order
to facilitate the exposition in the text, we relegate technical
derivations of the main propositions to the appendices.-3-
II. The Analytical Framework
Consider a stylized two-period model of a small open economy with
one composite good, serving both for (private and public) consumption and
for investment. In the first period the economy possesses an initial
endowment of the good and individuals can decide how much of it to consume
and how much of it to save. Savings are allocated either to investment at
home or to investment abroad. In the second period, output (produced by
capital and labor) and income from foreign investment are allocated
between private and public consumption. To finance optimally its (public)
consumption the government employs taxes on labor, taxes on income from
investment at home, and taxes on income from investment abroad. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the government is active only in the
second period.
In practice, governments encounter severe enforcement difficulties in
attempting to impose taxes on foreign-source income. For instance, many
foreign experts worried that lowering the individual and corporate tax
rates in the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 would induce a "capital drain"
from other countries since it would increase the net return to capital in
the U.S.. They implicitly assume that governments cannot effectively tax
capital invested abroad and thus cannot reduce the net return on that
capital to the level of the domestic rate of return (see Tanzi (1987)).
Dooley (1988) estimated that a significant fraction of external claims and
of external liabilities in various developing countries is unaccounted for
due to capital flight. L'Therefore,after briefly analyzing the case
JSeealso Dooley (1987), Cwnby and Levich (1987) and Ciovartnini (1989)-4-
where foreign-source income is fully taxable, we concentrate on themore
realistic case where such income is effectively taxed onlypartially.
We consider a representative individual with a utility functionof
the form
(1) U(c1,c2,L,C) —uP(c1,c2,L)+u(G),
where uP and u are the private and public components of theutility
function, respectively; c1, c2, and L are first-period consumption,
second-period consumption, and second period labor supply, respectively;
and C is second-period public consumption. )J
Denote saving in the form of domestic capital by K and saving in the
form of foreign capital by B. Since the focus of our analysis is on the
case where income from capital invested abroad cannot be fully taxed, we
assume that the pattern of capital flows is such that the country is a
capital exporter (i.e., B ￿ 0). Hence, the amount of saving channeled
through domestic investment constitutes also the domestic stock of capital
in the second period.
jJ To ensure diminishing marginal rates of substitution between private
and public commodities we assume, as usual, that uP and u are strictly
concave. Notice also that the separability between private and public
commodities embodied in equation (1) ensures that government spending on
public goods does not affect individual demand patterns for private goods
or the supply of labor.-5-
The private-sector budget constraints in the first and second periods
are given, respectively, by:
(2) c1+K+B—I
(3) c2 —K[l+r(l-tD)1 +B[l+r*(ltF)1 +(l-t)wL,
where:
-taxon capital income from domestic sources;
tF -taxon capital income from foreign sources;
-taxon labor income;
r -domesticrate of interest;




Obviously, in the absence of quantity restrictions on capital flows,
the private sector must earn the same rate of return on domestic
investment and on investment abroad; that is:
(4) r(l-tD) —r*(ltF)
When quantity restrictions are imposed on investment abroad, the
arbitrage condition (4) becomes:-6-
(4a) r(l-tD) <r*(ltF)
As is common, we consolidate the periodic budget constraints in






is the consumer (i.e., after-tax) price of second-period consumption in
present values. In order to highlight the issues associated with capital-
income taxation (i.e., saving and investment incentives and government
tax revenues), we abstract from issues pertaining to variable-labor supply
and assume that the labor supply is inelastic. Accordingly, after-tax
labor income is added to the initial endowment and their sum is denoted by
I in equation (5). jj
1/Itis straightforward to show that efficiency considerations usually
require to tax the inelastic labor income first before moving on to taxing
capital income. We assume that the size of government is large enough so
that the tax on labor income does not suffice to finance government
consumption and thus a distortionary tax on capital income is also needed.
Formally, we conclude that I —I.-7-
The second termonthe right-hand side of equation (5), (namely
B ((I ÷ (1 -t)r*)q
-1))plays a crucial role in the analysis. In case
there are no restrictions on capital exports, the arbitrage condition (4)
must hold, and this term vanishes. Otherwise (when capital exports are
restricted) condition (4a) applies and this term becomes positive,
representing irtframarginal gains to the savings of the private sector that
are channeled to investment abroad.
A maximization of the utility function U, subject to the budget
constraint in equation (5) yields the consumption demand functions:
(7) Cj —cj(q,I + B((l + (l.tp.)r*)q -1)),i 1,2
The utility obtained from these demand functions (the indirect utility
function) is:
(8) V —v(q,I + B((l + (l.t)r*)q -1))+ g (G)
Domestic output (Y) is produced in the second period by capital and
labor, according to a production function which exhibits diminishing
marginal products. Suppressing the fixed labor input, we write the
production function as:
(9) Y —F(K)-8-
The firm's demand for capital is determined by the marginal
productivity condition:
(10) F'(K) —r
Equilibrium in the first period requires that the demand for domestic





Similarly, equilibrium in the second period requires the equalization of
(private and public) demand for and supply of consumption goods 1/:
(12) c2 +G—F(K)+K+(1+r*)B







j/ This condition must hold because obviously there will be no savings
and investment in the second (and last) period.
Z/Thegovernment budget constraint is rtDK +r*tFB+F(K)
-rK—C.
Note that the term F(K) -rKrepresents the revenue from taxes on labor
income. notice also, that by Walras' Law this constraint is satisfied in
equilibrium.-9-
As mentioned before, we employ the analytical framework to examine
two distinct regimes. The first regime, which we may term the optimum,
entails no constraints on the taxation of foreign-source income. This
regime is considered as a benchmark case. In the second, more realistic
regime, which we may term the suboptimuxn, foreign-source income cannot be
taxed as effectively as domestic-source income. To highlight the
distinction between the regimes we simply assume that in the second
regime no tax can be levied on foreign-source income (i.e., tF —0).
III. The Optimal Regime
This section deals with the case where the government can tax
foreign-source income as effectively as domestic-source income. The
question naturally arises whether it would be indeed optimal to levy the
same tax rate on the incomes from these two sources and abstain altogether
from quantity controls on capital exports.
Since there are distortionary taxes as part of the optimal program,
the resource allocation is obviously not Pareto-efficient. In general,
the intertemporal allocation of consumption, the leisure-consumption
choice, and the private-public consumption tradeoffs are all distorted.
Nevertheless, we show in this section that the optimal program (namely,
the regime in which no constraints on taxation of foreign-source income
exist) requires an efficient allocation of capital between investment at
home and abroad, so that F1 —r*.That is, the marginal product of
domestic capital must be equated to the foreign rate of return on capital.10 -
Toderive the optimal program, the government maximizes the indirect
utility function in equation (8) subject to the equilibrium condition in
equation (13). The control (policy) variables at the government's
disposal are thetaxrate on domestic interest income (tD) or, more
generally, the consumer price of future consumption (q), the tax rate on
interest income from abroad (tF), the level of public consumption (C), and
the quota on capital exports (B). Carrying out the optimization problem
indeed yields the efficiency condition
(14) F' —r*
(see Razin and Sadka (1989) or Appendix 1).
Accordingly, savings of the private sector must be allocated efficiently
between investment at home and investment abroad. Since F' —r,the
arbitrage condition is satisfied if the two tax rates are equalized, that
is:
(15) tD —tF
In such a case there is no need to impose any quantity restrictions on
capital exports. J
jJ Evidently, this is an open-economy variant of the aggregate
efficiency theorem in optimal tax theory (e.g. Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971), Sadka (1977), and Dixit (1985)).- 11-
IV.TheSuboptimal Regime
We turn now to a more realistic case where the government cannot
effectively tax income from investment abroad. To highlight this
phenomenon we set tF —0and write tD —t.Inthis case, if the
government allows unlimited exports of capital, then capital will flow out
of the country up to the point where the net return on domestic investment
equals the net return on investment abroad:
(16) (1 -t)r—r*
This means that F' —r>r*,so that the domestic stock of capital is
smaller than in the optimal regime (where F'r*), given that the
marginal productivity of capital is diminishing. The mirror image of such
an underinvestment in capital at home is an overinvestment in capital
abroad.
Therefore, an interesting issue that arises in this context is
whether it is now efficient from the society standpoint to restrict the
exports of capital, and if so, how severe should the restriction be? One
may rnask, for instance, whether the restriction on exports of capital
should bring the domestic capital stock all the way back to a level which
is even higher than in the optimal regime (i.e. ,anoverinvestment in
domestic capital). Furthermore, is it possible that capital exports
should be altogether banned when foreign-source income cannot be
effectively taxed? We address these issues below.- 12-
Toderive the effects of a change in the capital-export quota on
welfare we totally differentiate the indirect utility function in equation
(8) with respect to B (see Appendix 2). This yields:
(17) — +v((1 +r*)q
-1),
where Vy> 0is the marginal utility of income.
Similarly, total differentiation of the market-clearing condition in
equation (13) yields the general-equilibrium effect of a change in the
capital-exports quota on the after-tax price of future consumption (see
Appendix 3):
(18) —(-((1+r)C1y +c2)((1 +r*)q -1)+r*-r)A1,
where:
(19) A —(1+r)clq+c2q+((l+r)c1+C2y)(l+r*)B <0
The terms Cly and c2y are the income effects on present consumption and
future consumption, respectively, and the terms clq and c2q are the gross
(future consumption) price effects on present consumption and future
consumption, respectively.- 13-
Considernow the point where no restrictions on capital exports are
imposed. We refer to this case as thelaissez-faire case. The arbitrage
condition in equation (4) then implies that:
(20) q —(1+r*)
Hence, employing (17) and (18), we concludethat:
dv -l
(21) —-vK(r* -r)A
Since r* <rand A <0,it follows from equation (21) that dv/dB <0at
the laissez-faire point. This means that reducing B is welfare-improving.
Namely, the government should impose a binding quota on capital exportsin
order to reduce the amount invested abroad. We show in Appendix4 that,
as expected, such a quota usually increases thestock of domestic capital.
Having established that some restrictions on capital exportsare
desirable in the suboptimal regime (when the government cannot effectively
tax the income from the capital exported) we turn now tothe question of
how severe the restrictions should be. As a benchmark consider K*,the
stock of domestic capital exported under the optimal, regime defined by
F'(K*) —r*.Given this benchmark we then investigate the question
whether the restrictions on exports of capital should be severe enough so
as to bring the stock of domestic capital to a levelwhich even exceeds- 14-
K*;or whether the restrictions should not be so severe so that the level
of domestic capital remains still below K*.
To do this, we evaluate the derivative of the indirect utility
function, dv/dB, at the point where K —K*(and consequently, r —r*).
This derivative (see Appendix 5) is:
(22)
[]KK*v((l ÷r*)q -1)A1rt C1q
wherec°lq is the Hicks-Slutsky compensated effect of a change in the
priceof future consumption (q) on present consumption (c1). Since two
goods must always be net substitutes it follows that c°lq >0.Hence,
dv/dB<0at the point K —K*.This means that reducing B further, beyond
the point where K —K*(and r —r*),enhances individual welfare. This
impliesthat the stock of domestic capital rises to a level which exceeds
the corresponding level in the optimal regime, implying that r <r*(see
Appendix 6). Thus, when the government cannot effectively taxthe income
from the capital invested abroad, it is efficient to overinvest capital at
home up to a point where the marginal product (r) falls below the world
rate of interest (r*).
Finally,we turn to investigate an extreme possibility:Should
capitalexports be altogether banned (i.e., B —0) whenthe government- 15-
cannoteffectively tax the income from the capital exported? Obviously,
if dv/dB <0at B —0,then no capital exports should be allowed.
It turns out that the latter is a real possibility. To seethis,
notice that equations (17)-(19) imply (see Appendix 7)that at B0 we
have:
(23)
[]B—— vA1 (rtc°1q ((1+r*)q-l) -c2(r*-r))
Now, when r is sufficiently close to r*, then dv/dB <0because A <0
and c°lq >0.In this case, a total ban on capital exports is called for.
The rationale for this result is straightforward. When r isclose to r*,
there is very little gain for the society as a whole from investing
abroad, because this gain is equal only to the differencebetween r and
r* (though the private sector can still gain considerablyfrom investing
abroad if r(l-t) is considerably below r*). However, the governmentloses
a significant amount of tax revenues from theoutflow of capital.
Therefore, in this case, it is not efficient to allow exportsof capital.
V. Conc1usifl
This paper examines the efficiency of restrictions on capital
exports. We show that when governments can taxthe income from this
capital no quantity restrictions should apply. This impliesthat before-
tax rate of return on domestic capital (i.e. ,themarginal productivity of- 16 -
domesticcapital, denoted by r) should be equated to the world rate of
interest (denoted by r*). Such an equality insures an efficient
allocation of the country's savings between investment at home and
investment abroad (see Figure 1).
When governments cannot effectively tax foreign-source income and
apply no restrictions on capital exports then the rate-of-return arbitrage
condition equates the after-tax rate of return on domestic capital (i.e.,
(l-t)r) to the world rate of interest (i.e., r*). This equality implies
that the before-tax rate of return on domestic capital exceeds the world
rate of interest (i.e. ,r>r*).We show that in this distorted world it
would be efficient to restrict capital exports and to increase the stock
of domestic capital up to a point where the before-tax rate of return on
domestic capital falls below the world rate of interest (i.e., r <r*).
This means that the stock of domestic capital induced by the restrictive
policy exceeds the level of capital that would have been optimal under
circumstances where the government is able to fully tax foreign-source
income.
Obviously, the case where governments can effectively tax foreign-
source income and impose no restrictions on capital exports is preferable
for the country to the case where it cannot effectively tax foreign-source
income and thus having to resort to quantity restrictions on capital
exports. Indeed, this argument may explain why the European Community,
which is moving towards a single capital market in 1992, searches for
ways to enforce taxation of foreign-source income (by aproposed system of- 17-
origin-based
taxation) so' as to eliminate incentives to locate capital
abroad (see Giovannifli (1989)).- 18- APPENDIX
1. In this appendix we derive equation (14). The lagrangian
expression of the optimization problemis:
L —v(q,I +B((1+(l.-tF)r*)q -1))+










where A0 is a Lagrangemultiplier. Differentiating L with respect to






where Vy c1y,and cydenote respectively derivatives of v, c1and C2
with respect to income (I+B((li-(l -t)r*)q
-1)).
Now, equation (14) follows from equations(Al) and (A2).- 19- APPENDtX
2. In this appendix we derive equation (17). Assuming tF—0,
total differentiation of the indirect utilityfunction in equation (8)
with respect to B yields:
(31) —
Vq + v((l + r*) q -1)+ Vy 3(1 + r*)
where is the marginal disutility of an increase in the priceof
future consumption. Roy's identity states that
(B2) Vq —C2Vy
Substituting (32) into (31) and re-arranging terms yields:
(33) =
Vy(c2 -3(1+ r*)) + vy((l + r*)q -1)
Employing the present-value budget constraint of the privatesector
(equation (5)) we conclude that
(34) q(c -(1+ r*)B) —I-c1
-B
Since I -c1
-B—K(equation (11)), it follows from (34) that:
(35) C2 -(1+ r*)B =K/q
Finally, substituting equation (35) into equation (33) yields equation
(17)- 20- APPENDIX
3. In this appendix we derive equations (18) and (19). Total


















Defining, as in equation (19),
(C3) A —((1+r)c1q+c2q+((1+r)cly+c2)B(1
+r*)),
then equation (18) follows from equation (C2) and equation(C3).
It remains to show that the right-hand side of equation(19) is
indeed negative. Denote the expression on the left-hand-sideof the
market-clearing condition in equation (13) by E. Thisexpression is
nothing else but the economy's excess demandfor future consUxflPtion.
Recall that q is the price of future consumption. Forthe equilibrium to
be Wairas-stable, the excess demand curve must bedownward slopping,
namely dE/dq <0.- 21- APPENDIX
Since
—c2q+c2yB(1 +r*)+(1+F')(cq +ClyB( 1 +r*))
and since F'— r, it follows that A —dE/dq<0.This proves that the
right-hand side of equation (19) is negative.- 22- APPENDIX
4. We analyze in this appendix the effect on the domestic stock of
capital of a restriction on capital exports. Since K —I-C1 - B(see
equation (11)), it follows that:
(Dl) —-(c1q+dyB(1 +r*))
-ci((l+r*)q -1)-1
Substituting equations (18) and (20) into equation (Dl) weconclude that




assumingthat present consumption is a normal good (i.e.Cj.y >0)and
that present consumption and future consumption are gross substitutes
(i.e., cq >0).
Therefore, imposing a small binding quota on capital exports(i.e., a
small reduction in B) increases the stock of domestic capital.- 23- APPENDIX
5. In this appendix we derive equation (22).
At K =K*we have
(El) r —r*
Hence, q >(1 + r*Y1and, consequently
(E2) (1 +r*)q
-I> 0

















Vy((1+r*)q -l)A((1 +r)c2cly÷ c2C2y
+(1+r)c1q+cq)- 24- APPENDIX






where Cjq j —1,2,is the Hicks-Slutsky compensated price effects, it
follows that:
(E5) []K—K*Vy ((1 + r*)q -1.)A1 ((1 + r) cq + cq)
Since the Hicks-Slutsky compensated demand functions are homogerious
of degree zero in prices, it follows from the Euler's equationthat:
(E6) cjq + qcq —0
Substituting q —(1+ (1 -t)rY1-into equation (E6) we conclude that:
(E7) (1 + r)cq + cq —rtcq> 0,
because two commodities are always net substitutes. Finallysubstituting
equation (E7) into equation (ES) yields equation (22).- 25- APPENDIX
6. In this appendix we investigate the effectof reducing B below
the point where K —K*(and r —r*)on the stock of domestic capital.
Since K —I-c1
-B(see equation (11)), it follows that
(Fl) —-(cq+ c1B(l + r*))
-dy((1 + r*)q -1)
-1
Substituting rr* into equation (18) we conclude that
(F2) []K-K*
-((1÷ r)dly + c2y)((l + r*)q -l)A> 0,
as we assume that present consumption and futureconsumption are normal




Namely, reducing capital exports increases the stock of capitalinvested
at home. Thus, it is efficient to overinvest at home.26 - APPENDIX
7. In this appendix we derive equation (23).
At B —0,we have from equations (18) and (19):
(Cl)I 1 —-((1+ r) Cly + C2y) ((1 + r*) g -1)+ r* -r
[dBjBO (l.s-r)clq+c2q
Since K/q =c2at B —0(see equations (5) and (11)), we conclude from
equation (17) and equation (Cl) that
Idvi -1
(G2) B — Vy A ((i + r)(clq + c2cly)+ C2q+ c2c2y)
((I + r*)q -1)-c2(r* -r))
VyA(((1 + r)cq + Cq)((l + r*)q -1)
-c2(r*
-r)),
where use is made, as in Appendix E, of the Hicks-Slutskyequations.
Substituting equation (E7) into equation (C2) yields equation(23).- 27-
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